A COGN I T I VE SEMANT I CS APPROACH TO DARWI N ’ S THEORY OF EVOLUT I ON
BEYOND LANGUAGE The series under the auspices of: College for Interdisciplinary Studies, University of Wrocław Kolegium Międzyobszarowych Studiów Indywidualnych, UWr In cooperation with: Faculty of History, Adam Mickiewicz University in Poznań Wydział Historyczny, Uniwersytet im. Adama Mickiewicza w Poznaniu Committee for Philology of the Polish Academy of Sciences, Wrocław Branch Komisja Nauk Filologicznych Oddziału PAN we Wrocławiu Scientific Board Committee for Philology of the Polish Academy of Sciences, Wrocław Branch Andrei Avram (Bucharest, Romania) | Jerzy Axer (Warsaw, Poland) | Katarzyna Buczek (Opole, Poland) | Piotr Cap (Łódź, Poland) | Lorenzo Calvelli (Venice, Italy) | Tadeusz Cegielski (Warsaw, Poland) | Piotr P. Chruszczewski (Wrocław, Poland) | Camelia M. Cmeciu (Bucharest, Romania) | Marta Degani (Verona, Italy) | Michel DeGraff (Boston, USA) | Robin Dunbar (Oxford, UK) | Katarzyna Dziubalska-Kołaczyk (Poznań, Poland) | Joanna Esquibel (San Diego, USA) | Ray Fabri (La Valetta, Malta) | Jacek Fisiak (Poznań, Poland) | Franck Floricic (Paris, France) | James A. Fox (Stanford, USA) | Stanisław Gajda (Opole, Poland) | Piotr Gąsiorowski (Poznań, Poland) | Isaiah Gruber (Jerusalem, Israel) | Franciszek Grucza (Warsaw, Poland) | Kazimierz Ilski (Poznań, Poland) | Rafael Jiménez Cataño (Rome, Italy) | Ewa Kębłowska-Ławniczak (Wrocław, Poland) | Grzegorz A. Kleparski (Rzeszów, Poland) | Konrad Klimkowski (Lublin, Poland) | Aleksandra R. Knapik (Wrocław, Poland) | Tomasz P. Krzeszowski (Warszawa, Poland) | Marcin Kudła (Rzeszów, Poland) | Christopher Laferl (Salzburg, Austria) | Barbara Lewandowska-Tomaszczyk (Łódź, Poland) | Marcin Majewski (Kraków, Poland) | Rafał Molencki (Sosnowiec, Poland) | Marek Paryż (Warsaw, Poland) | John Rickford (Stanford, USA) | Hans Sauer (Munich, Germany) | Waldemar Skrzypczak (Toruń, Poland) | Agnieszka Stępkowska (Warsaw, Poland) | Aleksander Szwedek (Poznań, Poland) | Elżbieta Tabakowska (Kraków, Poland) | Jerzy Wełna (Warsaw, Poland) | Donald Winford (Columbus, USA) | Anna Wojtyś (Warsaw, Poland) | Przemysław Żywiczyński (Toruń, Poland)
ANNA DROGOSZ A Cogn i t i ve Semant i cs Approach to Darwi n ’ s Theory of Evolut i on , 201 9
A Cognitive Semantics Approach to Darwin’s Theory of Evolution Title of the Series: Beyond Language, Vol. 4 Text © 2019 Anna Drogosz Copyright for this edition © 2019 Æ Academic Publishing All rights reserved. Except as permitted under the U.S. Copyright Act of 1976, no part of this publication may be reproduced, distributed, or transmitted in any form or by any means, or stored in a database or retrieval system, without the prior written permission of the publisher. Editors-in-Chief: Prof. Piotr P. Chruszczewski (Wrocław) Dr. Aleksandra R. Knapik (Wrocław) Editors for the Series: Dr. Katarzyna Buczek (Opole) Dr. Marcin Kudła (Rzeszów) Honorary Editors Prof. Michel DeGraff (Boston) for the Series: Prof. Isaiah Gruber (Jerusalem) Prof. Christopher F. Laferl (Salzburg) Reviewer: Prof. Barbara Lewandowska-Tomaszczyk (Łódź) Volume 4 co-financed by University of Warmia and Mazury, Poland Æ Academic Publishing 501 W. Broadway Ste A186 San Diego, CA 92101, USA www.aeAcademicPublishing.com contact@aeAcademicPublishing.com 1st international edition: Æ Academic Publishing, 2019 LCCN: 2018915236 ISSN: 2642-6951 (print) ISSN: 2642-696X (online) ISBNs: 978-1-68346-161-6 (pbk) 978-1-68346-162-3 (mobi) | 978-1-68346-163-0 (ePub) 978-1-68346-164-7 (pdf)
Dedicated to my Mother
TABLE OF CONTENTS List of Figures . .............................................................................................. ix List of Tables ................................................................................................. x Acknowledgments. ........................................................................................ xi Introduction................................................................................................ xii 1. Theoretical Background: Cognitive Semantics 1.0. Introduction....................................................................................... 1 1.1. The Conceptual Metaphor Theory...................................................... 1 1.2. Blending Theory................................................................................. 23 1.3. Force dynamics................................................................................... 28 1.4. Concluding remarks and an outline for the analysis............................. 29 2. Metaphors in Science and Biology 2.0. Introduction....................................................................................... 31 2.1. Metaphor and philosophy of science.................................................... 31 2.2. Models and metaphors........................................................................ 34 2.3. Functions of metaphors in science....................................................... 37 2.4. Consequences of metaphor in science.................................................. 40 2.5. The literal–nonliteral distinction......................................................... 42 2.6. The advantages of the CMT perspective on metaphor in science. ........ 44 2.7. Metaphor in biology........................................................................... 46 2.8. Metaphors in Darwin’s theory of evolution. ........................................ 55 2.9. Concluding remarks............................................................................ 65 3. The Conceptualization of Evolutionary Change 3.0. Introduction....................................................................................... 67 3.1. Charles Darwin and his theory of evolution......................................... 68 3.2. Evolutionary change is a JOURNEY. ................................................. 70 3.3. Genetic relationships among organisms and the Tree of Life................ 96 3.4. Conceptualization of change: consequences for Darwin’s theory.......... 118 3.5. Concluding remarks............................................................................ 123 4. Antagonistic Construals in the Theory of Evolution 4.0. Introduction....................................................................................... 125 4.1. The metaphor RELATIONSHIPS IN NATURE ARE A STRUGGLE. 125
viii A Cognitive Semantics Approach to Darwin’s Theory of Evolution 4.2. A blending analysis of “struggle for life”............................................. 132 4.3. Force-dynamic patterns in Darwin’s theory......................................... 140 4.4. The STRUGGLE metaphor in Darwin’s theory: functions and consequences............................................................................... 144 4.5. Concluding remarks............................................................................ 148 5. The Agent of Evolution: The Personification of Natural Selection 5.0. Introduction....................................................................................... 149 5.1. The analogy between artificial and natural selection............................ 150 5.2. Personification of natural selection and its reception............................ 158 5.3. Sources of personification of natural selection in The Origin ............... 163 5.4. Natural selection and force-dynamic patterns. .................................... 181 5.5. Personification of natural selection: functions and consequences ......... 182 5.6. Concluding remarks............................................................................ 183 6. Metaphors Evolutionists Research by 6.0. Introduction....................................................................................... 187 6.1. Darwin’s metaphors in contemporary texts on evolution..................... 188 6.2. Ostentatious marking of metaphors ................................................... 201 6.3. Graphic realizations of metaphors of evolution.................................... 204 6.4. Metaphors of evolution: Consequences for reasoning........................... 206 6.5. Concluding remarks............................................................................ 221 7. Personification 7.0. Introduction....................................................................................... 222 7.1. Definitions of personification. ............................................................. 222 7.2. Cognitive fluidity................................................................................ 226 7.3. Personification and behavioral domains............................................... 229 7.4. Personification and agentification in reasoning ................................... 242 7.5. Concluding remarks............................................................................ 246 8. Observations and Conclusions .............................................................. 247 References...................................................................................................... 256 Index . ........................................................................................................... 271 Name Index................................................................................................... 277
List of Figures Fig. 1.1. An Integration Network – a minimal template (adapted from Fauconnier & Turner 2002: 46) .............................................. 24 Fig. 3.1. A graphic representation of the metaphor evolutionary change is motion ................................................................................. 73 Fig. 3.2. The Time Orientation metaphor ............................................ 76 Fig. 3.3. The Moving Time metapho ................................................... 77 Fig. 3.4. The Moving Observer metaphor ............................................ 77 Fig. 3.5. The Moving Species metaphor ............................................... 78 Fig. 3.6. The Moving Species metaphor ............................................... 79 Fig. 3.7. The Changing Individual blend ............................................. 94 Fig. 3.8. The tree diagram from The Origin. Reproduced with permission from John van Wyhe (2002), The Complete Work of Charles Darwin Online (http://darwin-online.org.uk/) ......................... 97 Fig. 3.9. Radial and linear interpretation of the tree diagram ............... 110 Fig. 3.10. Darwin’s “coral of life.” Adapted from his notebook . ............. 121 Fig. 6.1. A horizontal phylogram ......................................................... 206 Fig. 6.2. A circular cladogram . ............................................................ 206 Fig. 6.3. The cone of Increasing Diversity (adapted from Gould 1989: 46) . ....................................................................................... 209 Fig. 6.4. Decimation and Diversification (adapted from Gould 1989: 46) . ....................................................................................... 210 Fig. 7.1. The integration of agentification and personification .............. 239 Fig. 7.2. Agentification of Empty Cause .............................................. 241
List of Tables Tab 3.1. Correspondences in the metaphor evolutionary change is motion in space ........................................................................... 73 Tab 3.2. The Tree of Life: Correspondences between the domains of TREE and RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN ORGANISMS ................. 99 Tab 4.1. The metaphorical mappings between the domain of relationships between co-EXISTING organisms and the domain of war ............................................................... 131 Tab 4.2. The “struggle for existence” integration network .................... 134 Tab 4.3. Force-dynamic patterns in Darwin’s theory ............................ 143 Tab 5.1. Nature is a Breeder/Gardener: The integration network ................................................................................. 155 Tab 5.2. The integration network “Forms of organisms are the result of an event” . .............................................................................. 168 Tab 5.3. Variation under nature and natural selection . ......................... 169 Tab 5.4. Natural selection as natural causation . ................................... 173 Tab 5.5. A summary of conceptual metaphors and blends identified in Darwin’s theory ..................................................................... 185 Tab 7.1. The integration network of the concept of Agency ................. 237
Acknowledgments This book has a long history and many people have helped in its evolution over the years. First of all, I wish to thank my former teacher and mentor, Prof. Aleksander Szwedek, for introducing me to the realm of Cognitive Semantics twenty-five years ago as well as for his sobering comments on the first draft of the manuscript. I would also like to extend my gratitude to Prof. Barbara Lewandowska-Tomaszczyk for her prompt and insightful review, which helped in improving the book. I deeply appreciate the continued support of Prof. Piotr P. Chruszczewski, the chief editor of this series, and his encouraging words during moments of self-doubt. I am indebted to Dr. Shala Barczewska for her amazing work as a proof-reader and for our never-ending and inspiring talks concerning Darwin, evolution, faith, and life during conference evenings and our own private meetings. Special thanks go to the team at Æ Academic Publishing for their professional help, true care for the quality of the book, and dedication to put the book together in time. Among my colleagues in the Department of English at Warmia and Mazury University, I would like to thank the Head of the Department, Prof. Ewa Kujawska-Lis, for her friendly and professional support, and also fellow linguists: Dr. Monika Cichmińska, Dr. Aleksandra Górska, Dr. Iwona Góralczyk, Dr. Robert Lee, and Dr. Joanna Łozińska, who assumed some of my teaching duties to allow me time to complete the project. Finally, last but not least, I want to thank my family: my husband and daughter for their support and patience and my Mother for her motivating lack of patience with my prolonged writing. I dedicate this book to my Mother, who taught me, by her own example, to never ever give up. The publishing of this book is supported financially by the Dean of the Faculty of the Humanities and Vice-Rector of the University.
Introduction For some, Darwin’s theory of evolution is the only scientific theory that can explain the history of life, for others, it is a lie from the pit of hell. Few ideas have triggered so many debates and so much contention. The only indisputable thing about evolution is that it has exerted a tremendous influence on Western thought, widely beyond the biological sciences. As Lakoffand Turner observe, the theory of evolution in its folk understanding as a competitive struggle “is everywhere in our culture. It is used metaphorically to justify forms of free-market economics, educational reforms, the basis for legal judgements, and the conduct of international relations” (Lakoff & Turner 1999: 557). While fully acknowledging the scientific value of the theory of evolution, we want to argue that its structure and logic depend heavily on conceptual metaphors and blends used to frame its major tenets. Moreover, the combination of metaphors and blends into a coherent whole enables them to function as a template for reasoning, not only about the organic world but also about any complex system. Consequently, the objective of this study is, in the first place, to identify the conceptual metaphors manifested in the text of The Origin1 and to determine how they are integrated into the network of ideas known as the evolutionary theory. Another aim of this study concerns the role that specific metaphors play in the theory of evolution: in framing the theory and its expression in language, in reasoning about organic evolution, and even in determining the directions of scientific research. For these reasons, the analysis also covers samples of popular science literature on evolution and discusses the current use of Darwin’s original metaphors. We believe that Cognitive Semantics is best suited for this purpose because it offers a systematic and principled methodology for analyzing metaphors. Next, we also hope that the findings about the metaphorical underpinnings of the theory of evolution will make it possible to formulate some generalizations about the functions of metaphors in scientific discourse. It is not the objective of this book to argue for the metaphorical nature of scientific discourse, because this has successfully been done by many philosophers of science and linguists whose work is discussed at length in the next chapter. We do not claim to discover metaphors in Darwin’s language either. The first person 1 Full title: On the Origin of Species by Means of Natural Selection, or the Preservarion of Favoured Races in the Struggle for Life by Charles Darwin (1859), henceforth The Origin.
xiii Introduction to emphasize the presence of metaphors in The Origin was Darwin himself, and many of his contemporaries noted this fact as well. However, to the best of our knowledge there has been no systematic analysis of the conceptual metaphors present in the theory of evolution. Next to the study of metaphors and conceptual blends in Darwin’s theory and in scientific discourse, we make some observations concerning personification – its definition and identification in discourse – provoked by the conceptualization of natural selection in the theory of evolution. We want to argue that the definition of personification should include a more encompassing characterization of its source domain (PERSON) and that personification should not be confused with a g e n t i f i c a t i o n , a metaphor we propose to exist alongside personification. The main body of data for our analysis is the first edition of The Origin by Charles Darwin (1859). Although five later editions of The Origin were published within Darwin’s lifetime, many researchers believe that in the first edition, before he started to modify it in response to criticism, Darwin’s ideas are presented in their purest form (see Dawkins [1987] 1996, Quammen 2002, Ruse 2003). On the other hand, some of the alternations Darwin introduced to the text are a valuable source of information on the effect that his metaphors had on his readers, hence reference to later editions is made as well. In this study, the pdf of the original 1859 edition by John Murray available on the Darwin Online webpage was used. Apart from The Origin, popular science texts on evolution are analyzed to investigate the developments of Darwin’s metaphors. They include papers and books by distinguished evolutionists (e.g. Richard Dawkins, Steven Jay Gould), texts on evolutionary theory found on various internet sites, and graphic presentations of the theory. We believe that the way Darwin’s theory is communicated, both in verbal and pictorial form, provides rich and valuable material for research in Cognitive Semantics. Firstly, the data is plentiful, easy to obtain and diverse, including texts of various levels of formality, from scientific papers written by distinguished scholars to popular texts directed at young readers to texts produced by proponents and opponents of the theory. Although this book makes use only of a small sample of the available data, it highlights the possibilities for further studies. Secondly, early texts on evolution written by Charles Darwin provide a well-documented record of his framing of the theory. A researcher can study not only The Origin, but also Darwin’s notebooks and letters, in which background information on some of the metaphors can be found. In other words, there is a record of the theory’s creation
xiv A Cognitive Semantics Approach to Darwin’s Theory of Evolution and expression. Finally, because of the richness of the data and the historical perspective (over 150 years of evolution-related communication), it is possible to investigate the development of Darwin’s original metaphorical framing of the theory. One can study the persistence or modification of metaphors in The Origin, their reception, and the use of new visual technologies (e.g. computer animation) to communicate them to the general public. The book has the following structure. Chapter One presents an overview of Cognitive Semantics to provide the methodological background and terminology for the subsequent analysis. The main focus is placed on the assumptions of the Conceptual Metaphor Theory: experientialism, embodiment, image schemas, conceptual metaphor types, challenges to the framework and its developments. The chapter also outlines the main assumptions of the Blending Theory and Talmy’s force dynamics. Selected research on the role of metaphor in science and in biology is presented in Chapter Two. The first part of the chapter outlines the philosophical perspective of the functions of metaphors in formulating and expressing scientific theories and models. The second part of the chapter provides an overview of the existing literature on the role of metaphors in biological sciences and in Darwin’ theory. We also provide reasons for the value of a Cognitive Semantics approach to the issue of metaphors in science. The following three chapters investigate conceptual metaphors and blends in The Origin. Chapter Three addresses the concept of evolutionary change, pivotal for the theory of evolution. Metaphors and blends that underlie this concept are identified. These include: the journey metaphor and its connection with the phenomenon of apparent motion, metaphors of time, objectification of change, and the Changing Individual blend. This chapter also discusses such issues as the representation of genetic relationships among organisms as a tree diagram, the image schemas inherent in the Tree of Life, and the connections between Darwin’s theory and the Great Chain of Being. Chapter Four analyses the struggle for existence, the most recognized Darwinian concept. In the course of the analysis, the integration network of input spaces, some of them cultural, that yields the concept of struggle for existence is identified. Additionally, three levels of antagonistic relationships in nature assumed by the evolutionary theory are discussed in terms of Talmy’s force-dynamic patterns. In Chapter Five, Cognitive Semantics analysis is applied to natural selection, another key concept of evolution. Taking into account the Event-Structure model, the investigation will attempt to explain Darwin’s persistence in personifying natural selection in all editions
xv Introduction of The Origin in spite of criticism and misunderstanding on behalf of his readers. Each of these chapters ends with a discussion on the functions that the identified metaphors and blends have in Darwin’s theory. Contemporary developments and modifications of metaphors introduced by Darwin in The Origin are addressed in Chapter Six. Both verbal and graphic developments are considered with a view to capturing the impact that these metaphors have had on reasoning about evolution, to identify some consequences for research in the field of evolutionary biology and the ways in which natural history is presented. The conclusions from this analysis focus mainly on the functions that metaphorical conceptualizations have in the theory of evolution. Chapter Seven changes the analytical perspective. Instead of focusing on conceptual metaphors and blends in evolutionary discourse, it investigates the possibility of redefining the metaphor of personification. In the chapter, various definitions of personification are presented together with a proposal for a revised definition utilizing human behavioral domains distinguished in cognitive archaeology. A metaphor of a g e n t i f i c a t i o n , distinct from personification, is also proposed to account for some of the difficulties reported by researchers in identification of personification and to explain some controversies around the reception of Darwin’s description of natural selection. Finally, several clarifications need to be made. This book was written by a cognitive linguist, not an evolutionary biologist or a philosopher of science. Although we hope that biologists and philosophers may find some observations interesting, the methodology and focus of the research remain firmly linguistic. However, at places, it seemed necessary to provide some background concerning Darwin’s work. While some evolutionary biologists may find such explanations simplistic or redundant, the explanations are aimed primarily at linguists. The next point of clarification concerns the analysis of The Origin. When exposed to numerous passages from Darwin’s book illustrating conceptual metaphors, the reader may come to the conclusion that Darwin’s language is extremely metaphorical. Hence, it must be stressed that in The Origin there are whole chapters presenting empirical data with no metaphors related to evolution. Moreover, when compared to some popular scientists, for example, by Richard Dawkins, Darwin appears to be very parsimonious with his use of metaphors. Thus, we do not want to argue that Darwin’s language is metaphorical but that metaphors are important in framing the theory. Thirdly, and most emphatically, we do not want to make any claims about the validity of Darwin’s theory. The mere presence of
xvi A Cognitive Semantics Approach to Darwin’s Theory of Evolution conceptual metaphors says nothing about accuracy of any scientific model. As philosophers of science noticed long ago, and as Cognitive Semantics confirms, all scientific theories are metaphorical in nature, and the evolutionary theory is no different in this respect.
1. Theoretical Background: Cognitive Semantics 1.0. Introduction This chapter focuses on the main assumptions and numethodology of Cognitive Semantics and related approaches to language. The first and largest section of this chapter gives an account of the Conceptual Metaphor Theory (CMT). While there is no need to repeat after handbooks on conceptual metaphor, its main tenets and terminology must be presented for readers less familiar with this branch of linguistics. This section also covers the axiological aspects of metaphorization discussed by Krzeszowski (1997) and Szwedek’s theory of objectification (e.g. 2000, 2002, 2011a). It ends by addressing criticism directed towards both the methodology and core assumptions of CMT. Sections 1.2. and 1.3. are devoted to theories which either extend and amend CMT (Blending Theory) or, while not part of Cognitive Semantics as such, provide useful tools for the analysis (Force Dynamics). The last part of the chapter briefly outlines the ways in which the methodology of Cognitive Semantics will be applied in the analysis of evolutionary theory. 1.1. The Conceptual Metaphor Theory The publication of Metaphors We Live By in 1980 by Lakoff and Johnson can be considered a symbolic milestone in metaphor studies. While acknowledging the role of earlier studies (e.g. by Richards [1936] 1964 or Black [1955] 1981), it can be safely said that Lakoff and Johnson have put a spotlight on metaphor study for the next few decades, and stimulated interest in metaphorical language in areas of research outside of linguistics. The core understanding, content, and terminology related to conceptual metaphor in this book come from Metaphors We Live By, because, although the body of research since the time of its first publication is enormous and the theory of conceptual metaphor has undergone significant modification, the ideas presented there have become well-established and widely used, even by critics.
2 A Cognitive Semantics Approach to Darwin’s Theory of Evolution The status of metaphor in CMT should be considered vis-à-vis the views on the possibility of description of reality through the medium of language and the distinction between the literal and figurative, the issues inevitably connected with science. Ortony (1993: 1–10) discusses two alternative approaches to these issues: constructivism and non-constructivism. The latter assumes that reality can be objectively described through the medium of literal language, that literal and metaphorical language can be precisely differentiated, and that only literal language is to be used in scientific discourse. Metaphor, in that view, is seen as deviant and parasitic upon normal, that is literal, language usage. The former view, on the other hand, assumes that “the objective world is not directly accessible but is constructed on the basis of the constraining influences of human knowledge and language” and cognition itself “is the result of mental construction” (Ortony 1993: 1). It emphasizes creative nature of language, thus undermining any sharp distinction between the metaphorical and literal, and finding for them no cognitive foundations. In this view, metaphor is postulated to play a central role in the way in which we think and talk about the world. CMT subscribes to the constructivist approach and Lakoff and Johnson make it clear right from the start when they say that “metaphor is pervasive in everyday life, not just in language but in thought and action” and that “our ordinary conceptual system, in terms of which we both think and act, is fundamentally metaphorical in nature” (1980: 3). 1.1.1. Embodiment and experientialism The extensive body of research within the field of Conceptual Metaphor Theory operates on the basis of three fundamental assumptions: • conceptual metaphors, understood as entrenched conceptual patterns, are ubiquitous in language and thought; • metaphorical mappings are systematic and embodied; • metaphorical mappings tend to be asymmetrical. In the context of the current research on how the theory of evolution is communicated, the most important seems to be the embodiment hypothesis, or the claim that linguistic conceptualizations are grounded in physical, cognitive, social and cultural human experience. Broadly understood, “the embodiment hypothesis is the claim that human physical, cognitive, and social embodiment ground our conceptual and linguistic systems” (Rohrer 2007: 27). Within this definition two broad meanings of e mb o d i m e n t stand
1. Theoretical Background: Cognitive Semantics 3 out: “embodiment as broadly experiential” and “embodiment as the bodily substrate” (Rohrer 2007: 31).2 The experiential sense of embodiment is chronologically the earliest and was brought to linguists’ attention by Lakoff and Johnson (1980). While Lakoff and Johnson’s main focus was on conceptual metaphors and their ubiquity in language and thought, they also noticed an intriguing directionality in metaphorical projections, a consistent tendency “to structure the less concrete and inherently vaguer concepts (like those for emotions) in terms of more concrete concepts, which are more clearly delineated in our experience” (Lakoff & Johnson 1980: 112). Johnson (1987) pursued the idea further by putting the hypothesis of embodiment in opposition to, what he called, the Objectivist view of meaning and rationality. He also collected converging evidence from various sources in support of embodiment: the role that the human body plays in categorization; the dependence of conceptual networks that provide reference for most human concepts on cultural experience, making them neither universal nor objective; the significance of metaphor in human understanding; the importance of metaphor and metonymy, grounded in human experience, in polysemic extensions and historical semantic change; the existence of non-Western conceptual systems manifested in non-Western languages; the contextual dependence of knowledge and rationality. He concluded that “any adequate account of meaning and rationality must give a central place to embodied and imaginative structures of understanding by which we grasp our world” (Johnson 1987: xi–xiii). The idea of challenging the traditional, Objectivist, conception of thought and reason as the manipulation of symbols that correspond to an objective reality independent of the reasoning organism was further explored by Lakoff (1987). Widening the scope of the embodiment hypothesis, he proposed experientialism or experiential realism, as a philosophical and methodological perspective on thought and reason: On the experientialist view, reason is made possible by the body – that includes abstract and creative reason, as well as reasoning about concrete things. Human reason is not an instantiation of transcendental reason; it grows out of the nature of the organism and all that contributes to its individual and collective experience: its genetic inheritance, the nature of the environment it lives in, the way it functions in that environment, the nature of its social functioning, and the like. (Lakoff 1987: xv) 2 For an extended list of senses of the term“embodiment” and their discussion see Rohrer (2007).
4 A Cognitive Semantics Approach to Darwin’s Theory of Evolution The other major meaning of embodiment mentioned by Rohrer (2007) relates to the physiological and neurophysiological substrate and is realized, among others, by studies investigating the neural structures and regions of the brain involved in metaphorical projection and image schema integration, as well as research in cognitive robotics. While we acknowledge the importance of this direction of research, it is not the concern of this study, and whenever the term e mb o d i m e n t is used in this book, it is in the experiential sense. We also follow Johnson (1987) in his understanding of the term e x p e r i e n c e : “Experience” is to be understood in a very rich, broad sense as including basic perceptual, motor-program, emotional, historical, social, and linguistic dimensions. […] [E]xperience involves everything that makes us human – our bodily, social, linguistic, and intellectual being combined in complex interactions that make up our understanding of our world. (Johnson 1987: xvi) Consequently, both e mb o d i m e n t and e x p e r i e n c e are given very wide scope in CMT, not limited in any way to biological endowment. Let us stop for a while to look at embodiment from a wider perspective of the mind and body dualism. The dichotomy between the mind and body is part of a series of dichotomies identifiable in the Western philosophical tradition. They include the opposition between our conceptual and perceptual, formal and material, rational and emotional side. As Johnson puts it, the consequence of these systematic dichotomies is that all meaning, logical connection, conceptualization, and reasoning are aligned with the mental or rational dimension, while perception, imagination, and feeling are aligned with the bodily dimension. As a result, both nonpropositional and figuratively elaborated structures of experience are regarded as having no place in meaning and the drawing of rational inferences. (1987: xxv) The mind-body dualism, present in the Ancient and Christian traditions, became an important part of Cartesian philosophical system. Descartes argued that “the world consists of physical substances (bodies) and mental substances (minds)” and that rationality is essentially disembodied, as “the body does not play a crucial role in human reasoning” (in Johnson 1987: xxvi). Such views gave rise to two kinds of problem, one ontological, the other epistemological. The ontological problem pertains to the question of how to bridge the gap between mind and body, reason and sensation, if they are taken to be separate. The epistemological problem concerns the source of certain
5 1. Theoretical Background: Cognitive Semantics knowledge: if “what the mind knows are its own interpretations, or ideas” then “how can we ever be sure that they do indeed accurately represent what exists in external reality” (Johnson 1987: xxvii)? Descartes’s theological answer that God is no deceiver could not solve this challenge. The dichotomy between the body and the mind survived in Kant’s separation of the cognitive faculties into two essentially different components: the material component associated with bodily processes, and the formal component consisting of spontaneous organizing activities of our understanding (in Johnson 1989: xxvii). Even though Kant acknowledged the bodily capacity for receiving sense impressions, he believed such “sensibility” to be “passive and lacking in any active principle or synthesis” (in Johnson 1989: xxviii). Consequently, Kant’s philosophical system assumed that human rationality transcends the body and is independent of any bodily determinations and experience, which reinforced the gap between reason and bodily experience (in Johnson 1989: xxix). The mind and body dualism proved to be consequential to semantic theories. Johnson (1987: xxx–xxxviii) gives examples of Fregean semantics, model-theoretical semantics, and Davisonian semantics, all of which assume that meaning and rationality are independent of human imagination and structures of bodily experience, and that they can be studied from the perspective of the correspondences between abstract symbols and the elements of the world. Johnson’s embodiment hypothesis grounded in phenomenology overcomes the mind-body dualism by proposing that “understanding typically involves image-schematic structures of imagination that are extended and figuratively elaborated as abstract structures of meaning and patterns of thought” (1987: xxxvi). 1.1.2. Image schemas Drawing on Talmy’s (1985) proposals on the role of force-dynamic patterns in grammatical constructions, Johnson argues for the existence of image schemas: recurring, dynamic patterns of our perceptual interactions and motor programs that give coherence and structure to our experience (1987: xiv) that “emerge primarily as meaningful structures for us chiefly at the level of our bodily movements through space, our manipulation of objects, and our perceptual interactions” (1987: 29). Further cross-linguistic and cross-cultural studies have confirmed the surprisingly limited inventory of such patterns. These image schemas are, following Rohrer, preconceptual in two senses.
6 A Cognitive Semantics Approach to Darwin’s Theory of Evolution “First, image schemas are developmentally prior to conceptual thinking, at least insofar as conceptual structure is accessible to us by means of language. Second, […] [they] are preconceptual in that they can underlay multiple different conceptual metaphors” (2007: 35–6). It is tempting to consider a third, evolutionary, argument, whereby image schemas can be theorized to constitute the earliest phylogenetic stage of building abstract thought and reason by reference to the physical reality accessible through the senses. Such a possibility, however, demands extensive research going far beyond the scope of Cognitive Linguistics. Johnson (1987: 126) lists the following most important image schemas: container, balance, compulsion, blockage, counterforce, restraint, removal, enablement, attraction, mass count, path, link, center–periphery, cycle, near–far, scale, part–whole, merging, splitting, full–empty, matching, superimposition, iteration, contact, process, surface, object, collection. The completeness of the list and potential hierarchical structuring within this list is open to debate, however the nature of image schemas is not the main concern of this study and is limited to their role in framing the theory of evolution. 1.1.3. Conceptual metaphor: mappings, directionality and the Invariance Principle Let us turn now to the notion of conceptual metaphor, fundamental in Cognitive Semantics, and pivotal for this study. Lakoff and Johnson (1980: 5) define conceptual metaphor as “understanding and experiencing one kind of thing in terms of another.” Johnson provides a richer definition. According to him, metaphor can be conceived as a pervasive mode of understanding by which we project patterns from one domain of experience in order to structure another domain of a different kind. So conceived, metaphor is not merely a linguistic mode of expression; rather, it is one of the chief cognitive structures by which we are able to have coherent, ordered experiences that we can reason about and make sense of. Through metaphor, we make use of patterns that obtain in our physical experience to organize our more abstract understanding. (1987: xv) Lakoff and Johnson (1980) label the two domains of experience involved in metaphorical projections the source and target domain. Instead of using well-worn examples to illustrate these terms, let us anticipate the analysis in the following chapters and use data from this study. For instance, when
7 1. Theoretical Background: Cognitive Semantics Charles Darwin describes relationships among organisms, he does it via ideas and words related to war, such as: (1) (a) [ …] what war between insect and insect […] all striving to increase, and all feeding on each other […]. (Darwin 1859: 75) (b) [ …] one species has been victorious over another in the great battle of life. (Darwin 1859: 76) (c) O ne large group will slowly conquer another large group, reduce its numbers […]. (Darwin 1859: 125) (d) [ …] bearing in mind that the tropical productions were in a suffering state and could not have presented a firm front against intruders, that a certain number of the more vigorous and dominant temperate forms might have penetrated the native ranks and have reached or even crossed the equator. The invasion would, of course, have been greatly favoured by high land, and perhaps by a dry climate […]. (Darwin 1859: 377–378) A thorough analysis of Darwin’s concept of the struggle for existence and its linguistic realizations come later in the book, but these quotations suffice to demonstrate that the more specific and experientially closer domain of war (source domain) is consistently used to conceptualize and describe the domain of relationships between living organisms in the state of nature (target domain). It is possible to identify systematic projections or mappings between these domains, for example: the participants of an armed conflict correspond to organisms/species living in an area; the victors of that armed conflict are projected onto the organisms/species that manage to suppress other organisms/species; the appearance of a new species in an area is conceptualized as an invasion, etc. At the same time, the distinction between a conceptual metaphor (relationships among organisms are war) and metaphorical linguistic expressions (all the quoted examples), vital in CMT, becomes clear. These examples also demonstrate that the source domain structures the target domain at many levels. First, there is the language used to describe the target, which is connected with the systematic projections of elements of the source domain onto the target (in the above example, elements of war include an armed conflict, opposing armies, victory and defeat, invasion, and many more not attested by these quotes, have their counterparts in the domain of relationships between organisms in nature). Second, and more important, though less visible, is the projection of imagery and inferences from the source domain. The logic of what is known about the source domain structures the way we reason about the target domain. Thus, in Darwin’s
8 A Cognitive Semantics Approach to Darwin’s Theory of Evolution reasoning, the struggle between organisms carries the implication that those that survive the “great battle of life” are somehow better than those that were defeated: (2) (a) [ …] if any species does not become modified and improved in a corresponding degree with its competitors, it will soon be exterminated. (Darwin 1859: 102) (b) I do not doubt that this process of improvement has affected in a marked and sensible manner the organisation of the more recent and victorious forms of life, in comparison with the ancient and beaten forms; but I can see no way of testing this sort of progress. (Darwin 1859: 337) Highlighting the role of mapping inferences is an important contribution of CMT to the study of metaphor. As Grady put it, on one level, inference mapping is another illustration of the richness of the conceptual structures upon which metaphorical usages are based. On another, it is a strong demonstration that metaphor is more than an innovative use of language or of the figurative application of a single term to a new referent. (2007: 191) It is inference mapping that is of particular importance in any analysis of metaphors in scientific discourse in general, and in the current study of the evolutionary discourse in particular. Research into the complexity of the mappings between source and target domains has led to the observation that, despite the theoretical possibility of creating metaphorical connections between any two domains (see Black [1955] 1981 and Davidson 1978 for views on unconstrained nature of metaphor), actual linguistic data reveals visible regularities and constraints. One such regularity concerns the unidirectionality of metaphorical mappings, noted by Lakoff and Johnson (1980: 112). It highlights the tendency to conceptualize abstract concepts in terms of physical experience or the tendency to map perceptual concepts onto non-perceptual ones, especially consistent in primary metaphors (Grady 1997, Lakoff & Johnson 1999), as well as the non-reversibility of source and target domain. The perceptual/non-perceptual asymmetry has already been discussed in connection to the embodiment hypothesis, so let us now focus on the non-reversibility of metaphorical mappings. As an illustration, Grady observes that while the concept of weather can be used metaphorically to reason and talk about economic or political situations, “the reverse metaphor is not possible, linguistically or conceptually (e.g., the nonsensical idea of referring to an actual
9 1. Theoretical Background: Cognitive Semantics storm as a recession)” (2007: 191). Similarly, a person’s affectionate disposition can be described in terms warm, but a warm blanket cannot be said to be affectionate. Another constraint on metaphorical mappings is called the I n v a r i a n c e P r i n c i p l e , which requires that metaphorical mappings preserve the cognitive topology (that is, the image– schema structure) of the source domain, in a way consistent with the inherent structure of the target domain. What the Invariance Principle does is guarantee that, for container schemas, interiors will be mapped onto interiors, exteriors onto exteriors, and boundaries onto boundaries; for path-schemas, sources will be mapped onto sources, goals onto goals, trajectories onto trajectories; and so on. (Lakoff 1993: 215) A consequence of the Invariance Principle is, as Lakoff further observes, that “image–schema structure inherent in the target domain cannot be violated, and that inherent target domain structure limits the possibilities for mappings automatically” (1993: 215). The limiting role of target domain structure is explored later in the context of metaphors of evolution. It is argued that scientific metaphors provide interesting data concerning how the Invariance Principle operates. While everyday domains such as life, love, time, economy, politics or actions are admittedly non-perceptual and vague, we nevertheless have some kind of experience with these, and that experience puts limitations on the possible mappings. For instance, to use Lakoff’s (1993) example, we can use the metaphor actions are transfers as in He gave me a kick, without inferring a transfer of possessions. In contrast to such common metaphors, target domains in science comprise concepts (e.g. atom structure, electricity, natural selection, etc.) which not only are abstract, but which also represent theoretical constructs. This means that when a theory is framed for the first time and/or is communicated to the general public, there is little knowledge of the structure of the target domain that could constrain metaphorical mappings. The Lakoffian Invariance Principle focuses on the preservation of image-schematic topology in metaphorical mappings. Krzeszowski (1997) suggests a modification of this term into the Axiological Invariance Principle to capture the fact that image schemas exhibit a plus–minus parameter, or axiological charge, which is preserved in metaphorical mappings. For example, the up–down schema, experientially grounded in the canonical form of the human body and its functioning, has a positive/plus value attached to up orientation and negative/minus value attached to down orientation. For
10 A Cognitive Semantics Approach to Darwin’s Theory of Evolution example, English provides many linguistic expressions which arise from the up–down schema and which consistently demonstrate positive and negative valuation: Positive/up He has risen to the top. She is in high spirits. This is a heart-lifting moment. It was a top performance. Negative/down He fell into depression. He dropped dead. He fell into the abyss of depravity. (Krzeszowski 1997: 113) Another example of axiological charge inherent in an image schema discussed by Krzeszowski and relevant in the subsequent analysis is the source– path–goal schema. According to Krzeszowski: This schema is primarily experienced in oriented (directed) motion, i.e. changing the position of one’s body in space from some initial place called source along some path to(ward) some destination called goal. The schema underlies the abstract, positively valued concept <purpose>, which is grounded in our experience of reaching a goal. Therefore, the schema is instantiated not only by all kinds of directed physical movement but also by various kinds of abstract movements as components of various actions. (1997: 124) The structural complexity of the source–path–goal schema is also reflected in its axiological complexity. Firstly, the positive charge is attached to the goal subschema. Additionally, the axiological value is attached to the distance between the trajector and the goal, and is graded according to the parameter: the closer to the goal, the higher the positive value. Secondly, the positive valuation of goal interplays with the valuation of the subschema path. Because goal is always plus, the path leading to it can have a plus or minus value, depending on whether or not it is straight. Since reaching a goal involves oriented motion along a path — says Krzeszowski — and since goal is plus, in most situations the path which is the shortest is also the best inasmuch it allows to reach the desired goal most expediently. Therefore, a straight path is valued more than a twisted one. (1997: 125) Krzeszowski also claims that metaphorization not only preserves the plus–minus parameter of image schemas, but also reinforces the positive or
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