11 1. Theoretical Background: Cognitive Semantics negative value of concepts and even activates latent axiological charge (1997: 156). For example, the verb “to divide” in its literal, mathematical sense is only weakly negative, however, the negative value is reinforced in metaphorical extensions such as divide and conquer, United we stand, divided we fall (1997: 157). The significance of reinforcing and activating axiological charges in metaphorization is discussed in greater detail when Darwin’s concepts of the evolutionary change and the Tree of Life are analyzed. 1.1.4. Metaphor typology The pervasiveness of metaphors in language involves their diversity, and diversity involves different metaphor types. The initial classification offered by Lakoff and Johnson (1980), refined and extended later by Kövecses (2002), assumes three kinds of metaphors depending on the cognitive function they perform: structural, orientational, and ontological. Thus, it is asserted that in the case of structural metaphors “one concept is metaphorically structured in terms of another” (Lakoff & Johnson 1980: 14), that is in terms of the rich knowledge of the source domain. As Kövecses puts it: “the cognitive function of these metaphors is to enable speakers to understand target A by means of the structure of source B” (2002: 33), which is achieved via the conceptual mappings between these two domains. Examples that Lakoff and Johnson provide from everyday English, now classic, involve: ARGUMENT IS WAR He attacked every weak point in my argument. (1980: 4) TIME IS MONEY That flat tire cost me an hour. (1980: 8) THEORIES ARE BUILDINGS Is that the foundation of your theory? (1980: 46) IDEAS ARE FOOD That’s food for thought. (1980: 47) LOVE IS WAR He is known for his many rapid conquests. (1980: 49) Darwin’s metaphor relationships BETWEEN organisms are war mentioned earlier is an example of a structural metaphor as well. Orientational metaphors, in Lakoff and Johnson’s (1980: 14) words, “organize a whole system of concepts with respect to one another” or, as Kövecses (2002: 35) puts it, “make a set of target concepts coherent in our conceptual system,” though they provide very little conceptual structure.